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PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON REVIEW 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICITON OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals retains exclusive jurisdiction to hear and rule on decisions of 
the Utah Industrial Commission, with respect to decisions on Motions for Review before the 
Industrial Commission under Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as revised and 
amended, and also pursuant to Rule 3, 14, and 29, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF ISSUES 
The Petitioner alleges that because of the construction of Section 35-1-43(5), Utah Code 
Annotated, as is presently interpreted in KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, (Ct. App., 
1994), 872 P.2d 484, he has been left with no remedy for injuries sustained while working for 
Utah Sovereign Lands and Forestry on or about September 22, 1994, while a prison inmate at 
the Utah State Prison, thus violating the equal access to the courts provision of Article One, 
Section Eleven of the Utah State Constitution, and his rights of due process. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION ELEVEN, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due courtse of law, which shall be administered 
without denial of unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil casue to which he is a 
party." 
SECTION 35-1-60, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED: 
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common 
law or otherwise, to the employee or to his spouse, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or 
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any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of his emplyment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or 
death of an employee " 
SECTION 35-1-43(5), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED: 
"As used in this chapter, 'employee,' 'worker1, or 'workman,' and 'operative' do not include 
an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal 
statute or regulation." 
SECTION 35-1-86, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED: 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of the 
commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order. 
SECTION 64-13-16. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED: 
"(1) Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity or for 
security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree that funding and available 
resources allow. An offender may not be employed on work which benefits any employee or 
officer of the department. 
(2) An offender employed under this section is not considered an employee, worker, 
workman, or operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, except as 
required by federal statute or regulation." 
SECTION 64-13-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED: 
"(1) The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what kind, 
quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or 
repaired at correctional facilitites. Contracts may be made for the labor of offenders, including 
contracts with any federal agency for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as 
practicable may be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or 
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supplies for sale to thye state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, materials, and 
supplies shall be fixed by the department. 
(2) An offender performing labor under this secition is not considered an emplyee, 
worker, workman , or operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, 
except as required by federal statute or regulation." 
SECTION 63-30-10(18), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused 
by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except 
if the injury arises out of: " 
(18) the acivities of: 
(b) fighting fire;...." 
SECTION 63-46(b)-16, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS REVISED: 
"As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from formal ajdudication proceedings...." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) NATURE OF THE CASE: 
In this case the Petitioner seeks to have the Utah Court of Appeals find that the 
ruling in KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Ibid., is unconstitutional, at least as it relates 
to work-related injuries sustained while an inmate, which require additional medical care 
following one's release from prison, and which may require additional time off work or possibly a 
resultant permanent partial impairment following release from prison. The KOFOED decision 
appears to violate the open court's provision of Article One, Section Eleven of the Utah State 
Constitution as it relates to the work-related injuries suffered by Mr. Skaar while still an inmate, 
and those in similar situations to Mr. Skaar, who upon their release from prision have no 
effective remedy for the ongoing resultant effects of those injuries sustained in prision 
(B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
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The Petitioner, DON BRENT SKAAR, while an inmate at the Utah State Prison, was 
injured on or about September 22, 1994 while working on a fire detail as it was returning to the 
State of Utah from the State of Idaho. He received some treatment for his injuries while at the 
Utah State Prison, but when released, the prison refused further treatment. (Record, pgs. 8-9) 
On or about June 13, 1995, the Petitioner, by and through his Counsel, DAVID K. 
SMITH, ESQ., filed an Application for Hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah, seeking 
additional medical treatment, temporary total compensation benefits, and possible permanent 
partial disability benefits, as are provided under Title 35, Utah Code Annotated. (Record, p.1) 
(C) DISPOSITION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah defended the State of Utah on the grounds 
that Section 35-1-43(5) and the ruling in KOFOED vs. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Ibid., 
prohibited the Petitioner from any recovery from the State of Utah. (Record, pgs. 8-9) 
On November 6, 1995 a hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge at the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, who ruled that VELARDE V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, (Utah 
App., 1992), 831 P.2d 125 n.5 prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on 
constitutional issues; that such is the province of the Utah Court of Appeals. (Record, p. 12) 
Further the ALJ ruled that KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Ibid., appeared to 
be controling in this case, and denied Petitioner any benefits, since he did not appear to fall 
under the Workers' Compensation statutes. (Record, pgs. 12-13) 
It should be noted that at the ALJ hearing level, issues relating to additional medical 
benefits, temporary total disability benefit, and permanent partial disability benefits were never 
addressed, since it was decided at the outset that the Industrial Commission lacked jurisdicition 
to hear the claim in the first place. Hence, no testimony was taken and no records were received 
at that hearing with respect to medical issues, lost time or other pertinent issues. (Record, pgs. 
12-13) 
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On November 10, 1996, within the thirty-day time period for filing, Petitioner filed a 
Motion for Review before the Industrial Commission of Utah on the ALJ's decision of November 
7, 1996. (Record, pgs. 14-18) 
After a responsive pleading had been filed on behalf of the Defendants by the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah objecting to the Petitioner's Motion for Reivew, (Record, pgs. 19-
22), the Industrial Commission ruled on April 2, 1996. It was noted that the material facts of the 
case did not appear to be in dispute. The Commission further ruled that since it was well settled 
that the Industrial Commission is not empowered to rule on constitutional issues before it, that it 
had to uphold the fiinding of the ALJ, and thus ruled that Section 35-1-43(6) (sic.) was controlling 
and prevented the Petitioner from any recovery in this case. The Petitioner's Motion for Review 
was thus denied. (Record, pgs. 24-27) 
On April 26, 1996 the Petitioner filed for a Petition for Writ of Review before the Utah 
Court of Appeals challenging the constitutionality of Section 35-1-43(6), UCA as it applies to the 
Petitioner's case. (Record, pgs. 29-30) 
(D) STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
While a prisoner at the Utah State Prison, the Petitioner, DON BRENT SKAAR, 
applied for and was accepted to work on a fire detail through a contract, entitled "Coperative 
Agreement' between the Utah State Department of Corections and the Utah State Division of 
Sovereign Lands and Forestry, Agreement Number 95-1399. (Record, p.1; Hearing, p. 45, lines 
24-25; p. 7, lines 1-4). 
Through cooperative arrangements with other states, including the State of 
Idaho, prisoners on this detail were often shipped out of state to fight fires. (Hearing, p. 7, lines 5-
10) 
In the case at bar, the Petitioner was assigned with a fire team of six trucks to 
fight a fire in Idaho. As the team was coming back to the State of Utah, the lead driver, Gary 
Peck, himself a prisoner, and boss of the fire crew, took a rest area fast so that the truck behind 
him was forced to slow down quickly. The vehicle in which the Petitioner was a passenger 
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slowed from 50 miles per hour to about 10 miles per hour. The truck just behind the truck in 
which the Petitioner was a driver locked his brakes, and hit the Petitioner's truck from behind. 
The driver of that truck claimed later to have been going 40 to 45 mph when he hit the 
Petitioner's truck. As a result the Petitioner sustained injuries to his neck, left knee, right 
shoulder, and felt numbess in hands. (Hearing, p. 46, lines 11-21) 
The Petioner received some treatment at the Utah State Prison for his injuries, but upon 
release from prison, continued to suffer symptoms from the accident in his neck, back and 
shoulder and knee, requiring further medical care, and possibly consntituting some permanent 
partial impairment. (Hearing, p. 46, lines 22-25; p. 47, lines 1-5) 
The Petitioner subsequently applied to the prison for further treatment, but was denied 
any further treatment, since they claimed no liability for treatment once he was released. 
(Record, pgs. 8-9) 
The Petitioner then filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, but was denied any 
and all potential benefits becuase of the ruling in KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Ibid. (Record, p. 1, and Record pgs. 12-13) 
The Petitioner has appealed the decision of the Industrial Commission denying him 
benefits because he believes his constituional rights have been violated in that he claims to have 
sustained serious injuries, which were incurred because of the negligence of others, and which 
require additional treatment, and which may permanently partially impair him for life, but for 
which he has been denied any redress before any agencies or courts of this state. (Record, pgs. 
29-30) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner argues that he has been denied any redress before any of the courts of 
the State of Utah, or before any administrative agency in the State of Utah, to seek recovery 
from injuries sustained by him while working for the Utah Sovereign Lands and Forestry under a 
cooperative agreement with the Utah State Department of Corrections, following release from 
prision. He claims he sustained injuries which required additional medical treatment following his 
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release from prision, and was unable to work as a result of those injuries following his release 
from prison, and may have sustained permanent partial impairment from those injuries, but has 
been denied access to any of the courts or to the Industrial Commission as a result of Section 
35-1-43(5), UCA. He claims the injuries were caused by the negligence of a fellow employee 
while working for Utah Sovereign Lands and Forestry, and were not caused by any negligence of 
his own. (Hearing, p. 46, lines 2-21) 
ARGUMNENT 
Standard of Review: Because the Industrial Commission is not a court of general 
jurisdiction, it lacks authority to address the constutionality of any statute. VELARDE V. BOARD 
OF REVIEW, Ibid. 
The Utah Administraive Procedures Act allows this court to grant relief where the 
Industrial Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Utah Code Ann., Section 
63-16(4)(d) (1989), or where "the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46(b)-16(4)(a), (1989). 
Since there does not appear to be any grant of discretion to the Commission in applying the 
particular facts to Section 35-1-43(5), the Utah Court of Appeals is to use the "correction of error" 
standard on review. AVIS V- BOARD OF REVIEW, (Ct. App., 1992), 194 Adv. Rep. 57, at 57-
58. 
Argument: Section 35-1-43, which was amended in 1993 by Section (5) to provide that 
the worker's compensation laws explicitly excluded inmates from the definition of "employee" 
except as required by federal statute from the application of worker's compensation laws. This 
Court has previously determined that this amendment was not a "clarification" of previous 
decisions on this issue of whether inmates were included or excluded from the workers 
compensation statutes; rather, this Court held that the only plausible reading of the statute prior 
to the 1993 amendment was that Legislature never intended inmates to be covered under the 
definition of "employees" for workers compensation purposes. 
- 7 -
This Court in KOFOED ruled that since workers compensation laws were enacted to 
provide financial security to injured employees during a time of disability, the act had no 
application to inmates since their right for medical treatment or financial security does not 
change with the occurrence of a disability. They are, after all, housed in a jail or prision, and all 
their needs, including medical needs and housing are supplied. 
The problem with the KOFOED decision, is that is does not supply us with the answer to 
the question of who will provide financial security to an inmate who is seriously injured in an "on 
the job" type injury while in prison, whether caused through no fault of his own, or not, and 
following his release from prision, is still disabled or is still in need of medical treatment, or 
whose abiliity to engage in gainful employment has been altered by the injury while an inmate. 
Sections 63-46b-16(4)(a) and 63-16-(4)(d), contemplates that inmates will be provided 
jobs whenever practicable, and feasible, given bugetary and security limitations. Inmates may 
work at jobs both inside and outside of the prision or jails, and surely one should contemplate 
that work-related injuries are likely to occur within the inmate population as they do in the 
workforce in general. To deny them benefits which may be financially devastating once they are 
released from prision. Simply because they were inmates when the accident occurred not only 
seems to be a form of "cruel and unusual" punishment, and certainly denies them access to the 
court system to seek recovery for those potential financially devastating injuries. 
Logically, one could argue that if a person is not considered an employee for worker's 
compensation law in the State of Utah, he is therefore not considered bound to the sole recovery 
provisions of that act. 
If that be so, then the common law doctrine of negligence would provide the injured party 
an opportunity to seek relief before the Courts of Utah. The problem in this case with the use of 
the common law of negligence is that this Petitioner is probitited under the Governmental 
Immunity Action (Section 63-30-10(18), UCA from bringing an action either against the State of 
Utah, the Utah State Department of Corrections, or the Utah State Divisions of Sovereign Lands 
and Forestry for either negligence caused by the State or any of its political arms or the states or 
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against their agents or employees, under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In this case the 
Petitoner has been found to have been engaging in fire suppression activities in Idaho when he 
was injured. (Record, p. 12) 
Utah's open court's provision guarantees a person access to the courts "for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or reputation. Utah Constituion, Article 1, Section 11. A 
person is apparently considered protected under this Article of the Constitution if the statute 
provides a person with a reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindiction of 
his constitutional interest. "(I)f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation 
of the remedy...may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic eveil to be eliminated." 
BERRY v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. (Utah, 1995) 717 P.2nd 670, 672. See also, 
WROLSTAD V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, (Utah App., 1992), 786 P.2d, 243. 
In the case at bar, this author has not found any reasonable remedy which the Petitioner 
might pursue, granted by due course of law. It would further seem that having been an inmate 
when the work-related injury occurs is insufficient justification to deny him of his constitutioinal 
rights as set forth in Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution. There is no clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated by denying such a person of a right to recover for injuries that 
each other citizen presently enjoys. Unless the law provides an "effective and reasonalbe 
alternative remedy this statute as is relates to the Petitioner is unconstitutional. HALES V. THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, (Utah App., 1993) 21 Utah Adv. Rep. 51. It appears 
that the leglistature has effectively closed the door to any right of the Petitioner, and others 
similarly situated, to any recovery. 
CONSLUSION 
The Petitioner claims that Section 35-1-43(5) should be found to be unconstititonal as 
violating Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution as it relates to the facts of this case. 
The Petitioner claims he should have a right to make a claim for workers compensation benefits 
following his release from prison for work-related injuries sustained while in prison if the results 
of those injuries on ongoing. The Petitioner claims that he should be afforded a hearing before 
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the Utah State Industrial Commission on whether (a) he sustained a compensable work-related 
injury while in the scope and course of his employment while an inmate, (b) whether he is 
entitled for additional medical benefits following his release from pnsion, (c) whether upon his 
release from prison he is entitled to temporary total disability if he is found to be unable to work 
because of the prison work-related accident, and (d) whether he is entitled to any permanent 
partial disability award for any permanent injuries sustained on the job. 
DATED this A ) day of December, 1996. 
- ^ v 
_-•» o' 
WID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Petitoner 
DON BRENT SKAAR 
6925 Union Park Center, #600 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
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APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
•Industrial Accident Claims Only4 
, State an$ Zip Code 
L*-~Sf r 
* 
4i 
* 
fNOTE: Three (3) copies of this form, including all 
supporting documentation, must be submitted when 
this fonn is filed with the Industrial Commission.] 
d c 
)loyer's Insurance Carrier 
PLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35: 
I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and inihe course of employment with the Employer on 
<^7 ^ at the following location: /<c^^/2^L^^^ C~-> TTi&x^,* . 
The accident The accide as follows: L.^At 'J/J%u**A~^ 
* 
U^L 
4*^4* 
C<uO 
I sustained,are: PlJ^cJ^^ /-*--/+ /t+t/e^ sfyjzAf~ J C ^ C - L ^ £ ^ , The injuries _,. 
<<r*j 
The injury caused time off work from y^Z'^d- v^f dk T to - ^ — x ^ 5 ~ ~ ;and 
I claim: [Mark an X in the appropriate space(s) and attach supporting documentation for each item marked - see reverse] 
E. Temporary Partial Compensation I. v^ Interest A. V Medical Expenses 
B. \/ Recommended Medical Care 
C. Higher Weekly Rate 
D . _ v L Temporary Total Compensation H. w^  Travel Expenses 
F. i/ Permanent Partial Compensation J. s/ Other(Specify) 
G. Permanent Total Compensation AvAs. 
My date of birth is Tf^Jp *7, £&&*' At the time of injury my wage was $_c*> 
working fr~€> ' hours^ per week. Also, I was/was not married and had ~ 
IS Vt* VW> & re * ^ 
*s— 
.P«" A^*^-; 
XL 
and I was 
m dependent children under age 
18 when I was injured. 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
e: ^ JcuU/3, flT 
rvv A\i 
Employee 
1 7 ^ 
nature of Attorney foi^ Employefi .j — 
set Address of Attorney for Employee 
• ^ ^ L .^  ( r r ^ van / fcVnW* ^ s 
, t^ate/Zip Code Telephone 
Z W ^re+rf <S£-/}A/Z^ 
Name 
^ 2 2 
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*&43C^~^ 
Signature of Employee j /? 
Street A 
City/State/Zip Code of Employee /y~ ~ T
 y 
mis^ir-Z/ol i ~.<&9 7*7*9/ 
Employee's Telephone Number and Social Security Number 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM 
WILL BE FILED BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION r ry~,r 
wcv Workers Compensation Fund of Utah Safe and Sound Thinking 
July 26, 1995 
Marjorie Mele, Clerk 
Legal Division 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0910 
RE: Claimant: 
File No.: 
Inj Date: 
Employer: 
Case No.: 
Dear Ms. Mele: 
Don Brent Skaar 
95-17677 
9-22-94 
Sovereign Lands & Forestry 
95-556 
Our office is in receipt of an Application for Hearing filed by David K. Smith, Attorney, on behalf of the 
above-named Applicant. 
On September 22, 1994, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah was the workers' compensation 
insurance carrier for the State of Utah, Department of Corrections. To date, no benefits have been paid 
on this claim. 
The Defendants first notice of this claim was in the form of the Application for Hearing. There has been 
no initial investigation performed, nor any denial or acceptance of benefits issued. 
Defendants request that the Application for Hearing be dismissed. The Applicant failed to notify the 
Defendants of his claim within 180 days. In addition, the Applicant is not entitled to any workers' 
compensation benefits since he was an inmate of the Utah State Prison at the time of the injury. 
According to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-43(5), the Applicant would be precluded from any 
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act since the definition of an employee does not include an 
offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or Section 64-13-19. See also Kofoed vs. Industrial 
Commission. 872 P.2d 484 (1994). 
392 East 6400 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 Phone (801) 288-8000 
Please contact me if you need any additional information. 
Respectfully, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
CTT:sb 
cc: David K. Smith, 6925 Union Park Center, #600, Midvale, UT 84047 
Sovereign Lands & Forestry, Utah State Prison, Draper, UT 84020 
Alaris Dillon 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 95556 
DON BRENT SKAAR, 
Applicant, 
v. 
* 
* 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF * 
CORRECTIONS and/or THE * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF * 
UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 6 November, 1995, at 10:00 a.m. 
The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was not present since he is currently 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, but was represented by 
David K. Smith, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Carrie T. Taylor, Attorney 
at Law. 
By prior stipulation, the hearing time was used to present oral argument 
on the defendants' Motion to Dismiss made in their answer dated July 26,. 
1995. Oral argument was made by each party and written evidence submitted. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the case was considered ready for order and a 
ruling was made from the bench which contained the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. In September, 1994, the applicant, a Utah State Prison inmate, pursuant 
to an agreement between the Utah State Department of Corrections and the 
Utah State Division of Sovereign Land and Forestry, voluntarily performed 
fire suppression activities in Idaho. In the latter part of September, 
after performing such activities, the applicant was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident on his way back to the prison. As a result of this 
accident, the applicant is alleging certain injuries and seeking benefits 
under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
2. The relevant facts and circumstances involved in this case mirror those 
found in Kofoed v. Ind. Comm'n, 872 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-43 (5), which became effective May, 
1993, applies to this case and provides: 
As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and 
"operative" do not include an offender performing labor under 
Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal statute 
or regulation. 
DON BRENT SKAAR 
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2. The applicant as "an offender performing labor," is not an employee for 
Utah workers compensation purposes. No evidence regarding a federal 
statute or regulation was offered which would suggest that the applicant 
fell within a federal exception. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be, and the same is 
hereby, dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall 
be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to further review or appeal. In the event a 
Motion for Review is timely filed, the opposing parties shall have fifteen 
(15) days from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a 
written response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-
46b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this / day of / ^ ^ ^ l y ^ ^ ^ , 1995 
<V053 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar #2993 
Attorney for Applicant 
DON BRENT SKAAR 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON BRENT SKAAR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT ] 
OF CORRECTIONS, and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND ] 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
| MOTION FOR REVIEW 
) Case No. 95556 
COMES NOW the Applicant, DON BRENT SKAAR, and Move 
the Industrial Commission of Utah for Review of the Order of 
Dismissal entered in the above-captioned proceedings on or 
about November 10, 1995. 
This motion is based upon the following: 
1. The administrative law judge found that the 
1 
applicant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time 
of his injury. 
2. As a consequence, the administrative law judge 
found that Section 35-1-43(5), which became effective May, 
1993 applied in this case, and the Defendant is not 
considered an "employee" for workers compensation purposes. 
3. As a result, the Applicant was found not to be 
entitled to any workers1 compensation benefits. 
4. Applicant claims that Section 35-1-43 Utah Code 
Annotated, operates to prevent him from access to the courts 
in violation of Article One, Section Eleven of the Utah 
State Constitution. 
5. It is Mr. Skaar's position that because he was 
injured on the job as a fire fighter, caused by the neglect 
of a co-worker (inmate), he sustained an injury for which he 
is without a remedy. He cannot bring an action under the 
workers1 compensation statutues since he is not considered 
an employee within the meaning of the statute. 
6. While he received some medical attention for his 
injuries while in prison, upon release, he was on his own to 
seek medical attention which was the fault of another. 
7. He cannot bring an action against the State of 
Utah, which is protected under the doctrine of governmental 
2 
immunity, and he cannot bring a worker's compensation 
action, though it is considered the sole source of recourse 
for industrial injuries because of Section 35-1-43, UCA. 
8. Although the prison offers its inmates free 
medical care, it does not provide compensation for an 
inmate's temporary total disability as a result of a work-
related accident once his is released from prison, and does 
not provide compensation for permanent partial disability, 
if there is a permanent partial disability rating. 
9. Because the Utah State Legislature has failed to 
provide an effective and reasonable alternative remedy for 
people such as Mr. Skaar in lieu or Workers Compensation 
Benefits, Section 35-1-43, UCA must be found to violate the 
Open Courts provisions of the Utah State Consitution, and 
should be found unconstitutional. See for example: Hales 
v. The Industrial Commission, (Utah Ct. App., 1993), 211 
Utah. Adv. Rep. 51; Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, (Utah 
Ct. App., 1990) 786 P.2nd 243; Velarde v. Industrial 
Commission, (Utah App. Ct., 1992) 832 P.2nd. 123. 
DATED this / ^\ day of November, 1995. 
3 
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OAVlb 11. lSMlTSfr-ESQ. 
A t t o r n e y f o r A p p l i c a n t 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Motion for Review to the following 
this 1Q day of November, 1995: 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
Heber M. Wells Office Building 
Third Floor 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Carrie Taylor 
Legal Department 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
Murray, UT 84107 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ, 
CARRIE T. TAYLOR, 6045 
Attorney for Defendants 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Telephone: (801) 288-8149 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 95-556 
Don Brent Skaar 
Applicant, 
v 
Sovereign Lands & Forestry 
and/or 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, by and through counsel, Carrie T. Taylor, hereby respond to Applicant's Motion 
for Review as follows: 
I. Applicant's constitutional claim should be addressed to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, not the Industrial Commission, is the appropriate forum to 
address the Applicant's constitutional concerns. The Industrial Commission, because of its limited 
scope of jurisdiction, defers to the Utah Court of Appeals for constitutional analysis. In Velarde v 
* DEFENDANTS1 RESPONSE TO MOTION 
* FOR REVIEW 
* 
* 
C< v: J 
Industrial Commission. 831 P.2d 123, 125 n.5 (Utah App. 1992), the Administrative Law Judge 
stated: 
It is beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission to rule on the 
applicant's constitutional claims in this matter. The Industrial Commission is 
not a forum of general jurisdiction, and accordingly, cannot interpret 
constitutional provisions. Rather, that task must be undertaken by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows the Court of Appeals to grant relief to 
petitioners who have been substantially prejudiced because "the agency action, or the statute or rule 
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(a). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is reviewed de novo 
by the Utah Court of Appeals. See Velarde. 831 P.2d at 125. Because the Commission's conclusions 
regarding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-43(5) will not be afforded any 
deference by the Court of Appeals, Defendants request that the ALJ's Order be affirmed and 
Applicant's Motion for Review denied. 
II. Applicant has not met his burden of proof. 
Even if Applicant were considered an employee for workers compensation purposes, his 
claims should still be dismissed because he has failed to support them by a preponderance of evidence. 
On the Application for Hearing, Applicant requested medical expenses, recommended medical care, 
temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation and travel expenses. 
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A review of Applicant's medical records reveals that he was provided all recommended 
medical care at the prison infirmary and was not placed on any physical restrictions after the alleged 
accident. Defendants are unable to locate any references to time off work, impairment ratings or 
travel expenses Furthermore, Applicant has failed to indicate what medical records or other evidence 
support his claims. On the contrary, an Emergency Fire-fighter Time Report indicates that Applicant 
returned to his regular volunteer duties after the alleged injury (See Attachment 1). 
Conclusion 
The Utah Court of Appeals is the proper forum for Applicant's constitutional issues. 
Furthermore, even if Applicant's employment status or the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated 
section 35-1-43(5) were not at issue here, his claims must nonetheless be dismissed because they have 
not been plead with specificity or supported by a preponderance of the evidence Based upon the 
foregoing, Defendants request that Applicant's Motion for Review be denied. 
DATED thks?/ day of November, 1995. 
CARRIE T. T A Y L O R , 7 / 
Attorney for Defendants 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DON BRENT SKAAR, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH# DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, and THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Don Brent Skaar asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's denial of Mr. Skaar's claim 
for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
Does §35-1-43(6) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act deny 
Mr. Skaar his right of access to Utah's courts, in violation of 
Article One, §11, Constitution of Utah. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As material to the issue presented in Mr. Skaar's motion for 
review, the facts of this case are not in dispute and may be 
summarized as follows: 
During late September 1994, Mr. Skaar was an inmate of the 
Utah State Prison. Pursuant to §64-13-16 and §64-13-19, Utah Code 
Ann., Mr. Skaar was engaged in fire suppression activities. In 
connection with such activities, he alleges he was involved in a 
work related accident that resulted in injuries for which he now 
seeks workers' compensation benefits. 
* ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The ALJ's decision concluded that §35-1-43(6) of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act prevents Mr. Skaar from obtaining 
workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered while working 
as a prison inmate. Mr. Skaar does not challenge the ALJ's 
interpretation of §35-1-43(6), but argues the statute is 
unconstitutional as a violation of the "open courts" provision of 
Article One, §11 of the Constitution of Utah. 
It is well settled that the Industrial Commission is not 
empowered to adjudicate constitutional questions and must, 
therefore, presume that statutes are constitutional. That being 
the case, the Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's determination 
in this matter. Mr. Skaar may petition the Utah Court of Appeals 
for judicial review of the constitutional issue he has raised in 
this proceeding. 
ORDER 
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirms the decision of the 
ALJ and denies Mr. Skaar's motion for review. It is so ordered. 
DATED this ^ . 
day of April, 1996. 
A 
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CONCURRING AND SEPARATE OPINION 
I concur with the opinion of my colleagues. However, I write 
this separate opinion to protest and articulate umbrage with the 
law as expressed in Kofoed v. Ind. Comm'n, 872 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 
1994) and in Section 35-1-43(6) of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
To place an inmate of the statef s prison system in a voluntary work 
situation outside of what most people consider to be the 
confinement routines expected of prisoners, to pay the inmate for 
the work, and then for the inmate to suffer an injury for which 
some degree of workers' compensation is not paid seems 
unconscionable and a dereliction of the societal duty expected from 
the workers' compensation system. It may be that the workers' 
compensation system should establish different standards for 
inmates and former inmates. Surely truly severe injuries that a 
former inmate might bear the rest of his life would inhibit his 
chance to otherwise resurrect a normal life. I would expect that 
the burden of trying to create a normal existence for a former 
inmate must be difficult at best. A severe and significantly 
limiting injury overlaying the regular problems could be an undue 
burden forcing that person to become an object of charity or a 
candidate for reincarceration - each being the human wastage 
desired to be eliminated through workers' compensation. 
mi*) 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission within 2 0 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0 
days of the date of this order. 
to 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of Don Brent Skaar, Case No. 95-0556, was 
mailed first class postage prepaid this 1 
day of April, 1996, 
to the following: 
Don Brent Skaar 
21 I Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
David Smith 
Attorney at Law 
6925 Union Park Center, #600 
Midvale, Utah 84 04 7 
Carrie Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Adell Bifcler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
orders\95-0556 
ORIGINAL 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Utah State Bar No. 2993 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DON BRENT SKAAR 
Suite 600 
6925 Union Park Center 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3373 
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DON BRENT SKAAR, 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF ] 
CORRECTIONS, and THE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, ] 
Respondents, 
PETITION FOR WRIT | OF REVIEW 
Case No. 95-0556 
1. Petitioner, DON BRENT SKAAR, through Counsel, 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ., petitions the Utah Court of Appeals 
for a Writ of Review directing the Respondent to certify its 
entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings 
and evidence taken in this matter, to this Court. 
2. This Petition seeks review of the entire order. 
DATED this ~>l\) day of April, 1996. 
1 
•Miyn 
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DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW to Counsel 
for the Respondents this xb day of April, 1996, addressed 
as follows: 
Commissioner Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman 
Colleen S. Colton, Commissioner 
Thomas R. Carlson, Commissioner 
Utah State Industrial Commission 
Heber M. Wells Office Building, 3rd Floor 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. BOX 146615 
Salt Lake city, UT 84114-6615 
CARRIE TAYLOR W ^ > 
Attorney at Law 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of^UTah 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ. 
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situation exists here with Mr. Skaar. He also was on 
his way to perform services in fighting a fire, was in 
Idaho, was involved in a minor, very minor automobile 
accident, in which he's now basing his claim. 
Basically, I can't see anything that distinguishes the 
Kofoed case from the current case, and in addition to 
the Kofoed case precedent, the Legislature has amended 
35-1-43 under subparagraph 5 to specifically exclude 
any offender performing labor under other sections of 
the Code would be — would not be considered an 
employee or worker for purposes of Workers 
Compensation. And I think that basically that's the 
support we're relying on for our Motion to Dismiss. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SMITH: Ms. Taylor is right when she says 
that this case fairly well mirrors the Kofoed case. If 
I may, I'd just like to at least proffer what — what 
the initial — what I believe the facts are in this 
case, just again by way of proffer. My client was an 
inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time he was 
injured. He was -- Certain of the inmates were, on a 
volunteer basis, were permitted to fight fires outside 
of the prison, as in the Kofoed case. 
And in connection with that, the Department of 
Corrections enters into — or entered into an agreement 
with the Utah State Division of Sovereign lands and 
forestry, and I have a copy of that agreement here, and 
perhaps it ought to be submitted for purposes of — 
of — of -- of examination at least. 
And the •— And the idea is that — or the 
intent is that the prison inmates then would be outside 
of the prison for a period of months actually, and 
would fight fires not only in the state of Utah, but 
outside of the state of Utah where needed. It could be 
in Montana or Idaho or Wyoming. 
In this particular instance, my client was on 
a team, a firefighter team, and they were coming back 
to Salt Lake City, but were in Idaho at the time, and 
they — they were in six trucks and they went rather 
quickly into a truck rest area, and one of the trucks, 
which was a fire fighting truck with another crew, 
was — came in rather quickly behind the truck that my 
client was a passenger in, and they were rearended. My 
client estimates his truck was going about ten miles an 
hour, and the truck that rearended him at the time was 
going about forty miles an hour. 
As a result, he injured himself, injured his 
left knee, his right shoulder, numbness in his hands, 
some neck and back injuries and shoulder injuries and 
knee injury. Since that time, my client claims that he 
*" *OCG 
received little if any treatment at the prison for 
those injuries. Since that time he has been released 
from prison, continues to have ongoing neck and back 
problems, for which he's been unable to get treatment 
because -- primarily because he can't afford it. 
And then recently, within the last couple of 
months, he was — I guess was involved in a probation 
violation which has sent him back to prison for another 
six months apparently. At least that's -- the word 
is — that's the word he gives to me. 
Your Honor, from what I understand the law to 
be, with the amendment of 35-1-43, which I think 
codifies what Kofoed — the Kofoed court was 
suggesting, saying that inmates are not employees. If 
you follow that case, and I — I think your bound to 
follow the case, then you would have to find that my 
client is not and was not an employee. 
And I'm not sure that — that — that as an 
Administrative Law Judge you can — you can find that 
that was unconstitutional, but — but I think it is 
unconstitutional. It's unconstitutional primarily 
because it violates the open court section of the 
constitution, Article -- Article 1, Section 11. And 
Article 1, Section 11 says that all courts shall be 
open, and every person for an injury done to him or in 
8 
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